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ABSTRACT 
Visual short-term memory (VSTM) allows for temporary storage of visual 
information.  Until a few years ago the model of visual memory was dichotomous. It 
was thought to consist of Iconic Memory (IM) , a very high capacity storage of short 
duration and Visual Working Memory (VWM) with very limited capacity and longer 
duration. 
Recent studies have provided evidence for an additional intermediate form of VSTM 
that lies between IM and WM: Fragile Visual Short Term Memory (FM) with high 
capacity and prolonged duration of up to 4 seconds. 
Currently there is an ongoing debate about the characterization of the capacity limit 
of VWM; some researchers argue that VWM has an upper limit of 2-4 
representations with a fixed resolution per representation (slot model), while 
others argue that there is no upper limit in the number of representations, but 
there is a trade-off between the number of representations and the resolution per 
representation (resource model). 
The present thesis addresses this issue and investigates the capacity and resolution 
not only concerning VWM, but also Iconic Memory and Fragile VSTM. Our goal is to 
provide evidence for or against the slot/resource models per memory type. 
Moreover, we investigate metacognition to determine whether performance was 
influenced by some kind of blindsight like phenomenon. 
We use a change-detection partial-report task with eight oriented bars, where 
participants have to compare the test array with the memory array indicating 
whether one bar (indicated by a cue) is rotated or not. To evaluate the resolution at 
which an item is encoded we use three different angle rotation (30°, 60° or 90°); 
furthermore, through the use of a precue, we manipulate the amount of attention 
allocated on the item to-be-remembered. 
In order to evaluate the metacognition, at the end of each trial, participants have to 
indicate how much they were sure about their answer. 
 
 
Our findings support that attention influences both the capacity and the resolution 
of VWM, suggesting that the resources of this memory type can be distributed 
asymmetrically; while in FM and IM, attention affects only the capacity, but not the 
resolution of the encoded representations, suggesting that they may be based on 
slots with fixed precision. 
Furthermore our results revealed that for the three memory types, the 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Visual Short-Term Memory (VSTM) allows for temporary storage of visual 
information.  Until a few years ago the model of visual memory was dichotomous. It 
was thought to consist of Iconic Memory (IM) , a very high capacity storage of short 
duration (< 500 milliseconds, Sperling, 1960) and Visual Working Memory (VWM) 
with very limited capacity (from 2 to 4 items) and longer duration (Baddeley, 1986; 
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). 
Recent studies have provided evidence for an additional intermediate form of VSTM 
that lies between IM and WM: Fragile Visual Short Term Memory (FM) with high 
capacity (from 5 to 15 items) and prolonged duration of up to 4 seconds (Landman 
et al., 2003; Lepsien et al., 2005; Sligte et al., 2008, 2009). 
Currently there is an ongoing debate about the characterization of the capacity limit 
of VWM; some researchers argue that VWM has an upper limit of 2-4 
representations with a fixed resolution per representation (slot model – Anderson 
et al., 2011; Luck & Vogel, 1997;  Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2011), while others argue that 
there is no upper limit in the number of representations, but there is a trade-off 
between the number of representations and the resolution per representation 
(resource model – Bays & Husain, 2008, 2009; Bays et al. 2009; Palmer, 1990; 
Wilken & Ma, 2004). 
The present thesis addresses this issue and investigates the capacity and resolution 
not only concerning VWM, but also IM and FM. Our goal is to provide evidence for 
or against the slot/resource models per memory type. 
We will induce participants to modulate the amount of attention devoted to the 
items during encoding, motivating them with an appropriate reward/punishment 
scheme. If participants, according to attention, are able to modulate the resolution 
(amount of visual details) of the object to be remembered, then this supports the 
resource model. If, irrespective of the attention, participants are not able to enact 
such modulation, then this supports the slot model. 
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A similar study has been recently conducted by Zhang and Luck (2011), and their 
results have been claimed to support the slot-model. Yet, we believe that their 
study can be improved in critical ways to better address this issue. 
 
1.1 Behavioral study techniques 
To measure the properties of VSTM researchers often use two varieties of  tests: 
Passive recognition task (Rensink, 2002) and Active recall task (Zhang & Luck, 2011) 
- In a passive recognition task (e.g. 
change detection task), subjects view 
a brief sample array (memory 
display) containing one or more 
objects or a complex scene and they 
are asked to memorize the entire 
image. After a brief retention 
interval, a test array (probe/match 
display) is shown in which one of the objects has changed with respect to the 
memory display on 50% of the trials, thus the subjects compare the test array with 
the sample array (Phillips, 1974) and have to indicate, in an unspeeded same-
different response, whether there was a change between displays or not (Luck 
2008, review) (Fig. 1). 
- In an active recall task, participants have to memorize the sample array that briefly 
appears and after a retention interval a test array is shown. Participants have to 
report a specific feature (such as the 
color or the shape) of one item 
indicated by a probe at the time of 
test. An example of the task is shown 
in fig. 2, where participants have to 
choose the color of the probed item 
by clicking on the color wheel.  Figure 2| Image adapted from Zhang & Luck (2011). 
Example of active recall task 
Figure 1| Image adapted from Jones & Berryhill (2012). 
Example of change-detection task 
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1.2 Iconic Memory (IM) 
IM is a form of sensory memory that holds a visual representation for about half 
second after the original stimulus has ceased. For this reason, it allows the flow of 
visual information to appear smooth and continuous despite frequent blinks and 
saccadic eye movements that occur about 4 times every second. Similarly, IM 
permit us to perceive the imagery in the film as being seamless (Demeyer et al, 
2009; Rathus, 2013). 
Photoreceptors in the eyes detect the visual information and send it to the occipital 
lobe, where the primary visual cortex (V1) seems to be one locus of IM, indeed, it 
has been shown that neurons continue to fire even after a visual stimulus has been 
terminated (Duysens et al., 1985). 
IM is extremely volatile and decays rapidly as well as it is easily maskable (Averbach 
& Coriell, 1961; Sperling, 1963; Rensink, 2000), so that even a flash of light (Sligte et 
al., 2008) or a new image (mask) can overwrite the iconic representations, 
suggesting that this type of memory must be driven by prolonged retinal activation 
beyond stimulus duration. 
Information in IM is not treated as consciously perceived visual properties, but it is 
rather perceived as pre-attentive, automatic representation on which bottom-up 
processes can operate (Neisser, 1967; Coltheart, 1980; Nyamsuren & Taatgen 
2013). 
When an image disappears, IM maintains a high-capacity representation of the 
outside world, which however vanishes quickly (Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Sperling, 
1960), and after this short period of time, the information is lost unless it has been 
transferred into the more durable, but capacity limited, form of VSTM (Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001). 
Findings from previous cuing studies (Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993; Sperling, 
1960) indicate that attention plays an important role in transferring the information 
to VWM. A further investigation by Becker et al. (2000), shows that a change 
detection task is greatly improved when the location of the critical item is cued 
during the blank interval. Indeed, the cue induces a focused attention that makes 
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possible to transfer the relevant item from IM to VWM, and to save this 
representation from being overwritten by new stimuli. 
IM was identified by Sperling (1960) who investigated the amount of information 
that people were able to take in from briefly presented stimuli. He presented an 
array of 12 letters (3 rows of 4 columns) for 50 ms and employed two report 
conditions. In the whole-report condition the participants were asked to recall all 
the letters that they could remember. On average, subjects recalled 4,5 letters out 
of 12 (37.5%). 
In the partial-report condition (fig. 
3) the matrix of 12 letters was 
immediately followed by an 
auditory cue. The cue limited recall 
to one of the three rows. For 
instance, a high tone could 
indicate that the subject only had 
to recall letters from the top row. In the partial report condition subjects accurately 
recalled, on average, 3.3 out of  4 letters (82%). Importantly, participants didn’t 
know in advance which row would be cued, and still showed a dramatic increase in 
performance in the partial-report condition. Sperling concluded that all items are 
briefly stored, but that this high capacity storages is gone in the time it takes to 
report on the letters (and therefore is not observed in the whole-report condition). 
Sperling then did an additional experiment, a delayed partial-report, to determine 
the time course of this fading. By increasing the delay between cue and stimulus 
offset, partial-report performance decreased, until it reached the level of the 
whole-report performance, at cue delays of about 500-800 ms.  Therefore, initially 
there is a very high capacity storage, but it is erased  very quickly in about 500 ms. 




Figure 3| Sperling paradigm 
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1.3 Visual Working Memory (VWM) 
Visual working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) represents the essential interplay 
between perception, long-term memory and action. It works continuously to 
temporarily retain and process information and for the manipulation of already 
acquired knowledge (Portrat, 2011). 
VWM is considered as the cornerstone of the cognitive system and many studies 
revealed a strong correlation between individual differences in VWM capacity and 
general intelligence, problem solving and scholastic aptitude (e.g., Kyllonen & 
Christal, 1990; Cowan 2005). 
VWM has capacity limits characterized by two parameters: the number of items 
that can be stored and the quality with which they are remembered (precision or 
resolution). 
Currently there are two important models regarding the flexibility of the allocation 
of VWM resources (Fukuda et al., 2010): the fixed-resolution hypothesis (Slots 
model) and the Flexible-resource hypothesis (Resources model). 
• The fixed-resolution hypothesis proposes that the number of items that can be 
stored in memory (capacity: K) is strictly limited corresponding to only three or four 
items (Luck & Vogel, 1997) and cannot be increased by decreasing the resolution 
of the representations (Anderson et al., 2011; Zhang & Luck, 2008).  
This model suggests that VWM resources are discretely allocated to few and 
constant fixed slots, each of them is characterized by a fixed amount of resources 
that leads to a fixed resolution per representation. When all slots are filled, no 
information about the additional items is maintained, and there is little or no 
flexibility in the trade-off between quantity and quality of representations (Barton 
et al., 2009; Rouder et al., 2008; Zhang & Luck, 2008) 
- In addition a related account proposes that if the number of stored  items is below 
the maximum number of slots, then objects can be represented by multiple slots. 
This ‘‘slots + averaging’’ model would predict that precision can increase only when 
very few items are represented (Zhang & Luck, 2008) (see fig.4) 
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Figure 4 | From Bays Husein 2009. Schematic representation of resources allocation in the resource model and 
in the slot+ averaging model. In the resource model a limited resource (yellow) is spread among visual items 
(black symbols). Greater resources dedicated to an item lead to higher precision on subsequent recall.  In the 
slots + averaging model, memory is divided into discrete slots (e.g. four) of equal resolution, and more slots can 
be allocated on one item to increase precision. The two models make equivalent predictions for one, two, and 
four items. When the number of items exceeds the number of slots, the slots + averaging model predicts that no 
information will be stored about items without a slot. 
- In contrast the flexible-resource hypothesis 
doesn’t impose an upper limit on capacity, 
but suggests that VWM capacity reflects the 
flexible allocation of limited cognitive 
resources.  Thus, VWM resources can be 
flexibly allocated and focused on a small 
number of items to create high-quality 
representations, or distributed among a large 
number of items to create low-quality 
representations. (Bays & Husain, 2008; 2009; 
Palmer, 1990; Wilken & Ma, 2004) (see fig.4). 
To test these hypotheses, researchers measure how precision and capacity of VWM 
change as varying the number of items in the displays (set size), assuming that 
observers would attempt to store as many items as possible in VWM.  
Zhang & Luck (2011) chose a different approach to assess whether people are able 
to do a trade-off, between precision and capacity, by motivation them to do so or 
not. 
They used a delayed color-discrimination task, (which amounts to an active recall 
task), where subjects were shown a sample array with colored items and after a 
delay, were asked to remember the color of one probed item. Participants could 
respond by choosing the color on a continuous colored wheel (for high precision) or 
among some discrete color spokes (for low precision) (see fig. 5) 
They used different methods to motivate observers to store a large number of low-
precision representations, but all these approaches failed. To exclude the 
possibility that the failure could be caused by weak motivation, the trade-off was 
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also tested in IM and unveiled that in this case subjects 
were able to make a trade-off between resolution and 
capacity.  
The conclusion was that the manipulations were strong 
enough to influence IM, but not VWM. Thus, in 
accordance with the slot model, people, presumably 
regardless of which strategy they used, were not able to 
distribute their resources between elements, but could 
only store items in a few slots with a fixed precision. 
 
In a recent work Murray et al. (2012) tested whether 
trade-off between quantity and quality was under top-
down control and in particular, if participants can 
strategically optimize the trade-off according to task 
demands. 
They used change-detection tasks, preceded by the presentation of predictive cues 
regarding either the likely number of items in the upcoming array, the precision 
with which they needed to be recalled, or a combination of the two; in this way  
they provided participants with predictive information to help them anticipate what 
they should expect on the subsequent memory array. Then, subjects were 
presented a memory array with randomly oriented colored bars to encode, and 
after a delay, a single item was re-presented with a different orientation. Subjects 
had to judge whether the probed item was rotated clockwise or anti-clockwise 
relative to the original memory item.  
Murray et al., like Zhang and Luck, found that participants were not able to use the 
provided strategic information and the trade-off between quality and quantity in 
VWM was not influenced by the foreknowledge of expected task demands, thus 
top-down control mechanisms seemed not to induce any trade-off between 
precision and capacity in VWM.  
  
Figure 5| From Zhang and 
Luck 2011. Trial structure 
of the experiment of 




Figure 6 | General trial design. On each trial, subjects had to retain the orientation of eight rectangles across 
a retention interval. After the retention interval, one of the rectangles changed orientation on 50 percent of 
the trials and subjects had to detect this change. On each trial, a cue singled out the item to change, either 
(A), during the retention interval (retro-cue) to measure FM  or (B) during the probe array (post-cue) to 
measure VWM  (Vandenbroucke et al., 2011). 
1.4 Fragile Visual Short Term Memory (FM) 
Recently, a long lasting, high-capacity storage seems to have been unveiled. The 
critical difference in the more recent investigations seems to be the type of stimuli 
that are used (oriented bars, instead of letters), and the type of task (change 
detection, which amounts to passive recall, compared to the initial active recall).  
In a canonical set-up (see fig. 6), participants performed a change detection task, 
where they have to indicate whether the memory display and the test display were 
identical. Importantly, a cue indicated the only possible locus of change. This cue 
could either appear together with the test display (post-cue), or during the blank 
between memory and test display (retro-cue).  
Critically, the retro-cue allowed subjects to access their visual memory before 
new, and possibly interfering, visual information appeared (Landman et al., 2003; 
Sligte et al. 2011). 
In this set-up a benefit for the retro-cue condition, compared to the post-cue 
condition, was observed, even when the retro-cue was presented from 1 to 4 
seconds after offset of the memory display (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 
2003; Landman et al., 2004; Sligte et al., 2009) and people could report a maximum 
of 15 items out of 32 items showed (Sligte et al., 2008).  
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Thus, it seems that visual memory can be enhanced in a change detection task 
when participants are presented with a retro-cue compared to a post-cue. In the 
post-cue condition capacity hovers around 4, the typical capacity of VWM (Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Vogel et al., 2001), whereas in the retro-cue condition capacity can be 
as high as 15. 
This findings are surprising, considering that IM lasts only 0,5 seconds (Sperling, 
1960) and it originally seemed that at longer delays visual memory collapses to 
VWM, with its low capacity. Therefore this research led to the suggestion of an 
additional form of storage, with some characteristics similar to IM and others to 
WM. A storage putatively coined fragile VSTM (FM – Sligte et al., 2008) (table 1). 
 




Importantly, this improvement in change detection performance is not attributable 
to speed-accuracy trade-offs (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Lepsien et al., 2005), response 
biases (Griffin & Nobre, 2003), eye movements (Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Matsukura 
et al., 2007), or articulation (Makovski & Jiang, 2007; Makovski et al., 2008). 
The subsequent question was whether the FM was a reflection of IM or VWM. To 
reject this possibility, several behavioral and neuroimaging experiments have been 
performed (Sligte et al., 2008, 2009; Sligte et al., 2010). 
• Behavioral experiments demonstrate that FM is not a form of IM. Landman et al. 
(2003; 2004) found that in FM features are bound into coherent objects, a 
characteristic never been observed in IM, moreover the presence of homogeneous 
textures (Landman et al. 2004)  or a flash of light presented directly after stimulus 
presentation (Sligte et al., 2008) erase IM, but have no effect on FM capacity. 
Differences in stimulus contrast have no influence on FM capacity, but have a 
strong effect on IM capacity (Sligte et al., 2008).  
Table 1 | Overview of the different features of IM, FM and VWM 
 10 
 
Finally, IM is erased by any visual stimulation (even a flash of light, e.g. Sligte et al., 
2008), whereas FM is only erased by similar objects at the same location as the to-
be-remembered objects, therefore a flash of light, or even similar objects at 
another location, or different objects at the same location do not erase FM (Pinto et 
al., 2013).  
• In addition, neuroimaging experiments reveal that FM produces an increase in V4 
activity at the retinotopic location corresponding to the item held in FM (Sligte et 
al., 2009),  on the contrary, the neural site of IM seems to be at a lower level in the 
neural hierarchy, in the primary visual cortex, V1 (Duysens et al., 1985; Sligte et al., 
2008; Sligte et al., 2011). 
• Behavioral experiments clearly demonstrate that FM is neither a form of VWM. 
When a new visual scene consisted of similar objects, appears at the same location 
as the to-be recalled objects, FM is completely overwritten (Pinto et al. 2013), 
while VWM is resistant to erasing. 
Further difference is related to resolution (amount of visual detail). In an 
experiment, Sligte et al. (2010) combined a change detection task with an 
identification task, that is participants had to detect whether the cued item was 
changed or not and, in case of change trials, they were asked to identify the original 
cued object from the memory array by choosing one object from the four ones 
presented in the identification display (Fig. 7). They found that in FM objects are 
represented with higher precision than in VWM, which is an additional evidence 
that FM and VWM are probably based in distinct systems. 
Figure 7 | Experimental design. Subjects performed a change detection task to measure the capacity of short-term 
memory representations (black box). After each change trial, an identification display was presented that contained the 
item that was present in the memory display, but not anymore in the match display (so-called pre-change item) in 
addition to three distracter items that were present in neither memory nor test display (red box). (Sligte et al. 2010) 
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Another evidence comes from Vandenbroucke et al. (2011) who manipulated 
attention during encoding of the stimulus and observed that a decrease of 
attention led to a large reduction in WM capacity, but not in FM capacity. 
• From a neural point of view the difference is less clear, however fMRI study 
showed that V4 activity is related to storage in both FM and VWM, but when an 
item is represented in VWM, activity was higher in a retinotopically specific way 
(Sligte et al., 2009).  
In the specific, they found that V4 activity was low when the cued item was not 
represented, medium when it was in FM, and high when it was in VWM (fig. 8). 
 
In a following experiment, Sligte et al. (2011) demonstrated that at least the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) – an area known to play a primary role in 
WM (Curtis et al., 2003 ) – is not involved in the storage of FM; in fact applying 
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) over the right DLPFC, FM remained 
unaffected while VWM decreased. 
To summarize, all these results provide evidence for the existence of a new form of 
memory discernible from both IM and VWM.  
 
  
Figure 8 |From Sligte et al. 2009.  Left: regions of interest were outlined by mapping V1-V4. Right: we outlined 
eight retinotopic locations in V1–V4 by showing rotating white rectangles at eight different radial positions. 
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1.5 Three Stages In Visual Short-Term Memory 
 
 
Neural loops between brain areas enable information to be retained in visual short-
term memory after the stimuli have disappeared and, according to which regions 
are involved in the loop, the VSTM representations display different characteristics.  
When the loops include the visual areas V1 up to V3, the representations will be 
feature-based  and the short-term memory will have the typical iconic memory 
characteristics. 
If the loop involves visual extrastriate areas (V4) and inferior temporal cortex (IT), 
the representations will be object-based (fragile VSTM representations). 
Finally, when the loop include the frontal and parietal areas that are involved in top-
down attention, the representation will be attention-based and the memory traces 
will have the VWM characteristics, such as capacity limits. 
 
  
Fig. 9. From Sligte et al. 2011. Schematic representation of the three stages in visual short-term memory 
Yellow: Iconic memory representations 
Blue: Fragile VSTM representations 
Red: Visual Working memory representations 
 13 
 
2. AIM OF THE EXPERIMENT 
In the light of the foregoing findings about the different types of visual memory, we 
investigate not only VWM, but also IM and FM, with regards to the question of 
whether the memory type is slot or resource based. 
Importantly there are some crucial differences in our investigation, compared to 
Zhang and Luck’s research: 
- First, we use oriented white bars instead of colors to measure the precision of the 
remembered items. A color wheel is not intuitive and may not give a reasonable 
measure of the precision. For example if the to-be-remembered item was red, blue 
may be a bigger mistake as answer than yellow for one person, but not for the 
other. With oriented bars the difference in orientation degree seems like a natural 
measure of precision.  
- Second, we use a change-detection task instead of an active recall task. Active 
recall is generally harder than passive recognition, and by itself may induce people 
to always go for high precision representations.  
- Third, since participants seem to be not able to trade-off capacity with precision 
using only strategic information provided, we use a stronger approach, that consist 
in the manipulation of attention. Through the presence/absence of a precue, we 
induce people to allocate attention on a specific spatial location or we encourage 
them to spread it equally among all the elements. 
To motivate people to actually shift their attention, we give them monetary reward 
for correct answer and punishment for incorrect ones. 
Moreover, we investigate metacognition about performance. Simply put, 
metacognition indicates how much knowledge a person has about one’s own 
cognitive experiences, processes and strategies (Flavell, 1979). It is known that 
sometimes people perform well, although they are not aware of the information on 
which they base their performance, for example some people who have the primary 
visual cortex damaged, considered essential for sight, experience the phenomenon 
of blindsight. The blindsight is the ability to correctly indicate the spatial location of 
a visual stimulus, without the conscious perception of seeing anything at all 
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(Weiskrantz et al., 1974). Even though people claim they are just guessing, their 
performance is significantly above chance (Radoeva et al., 2008). 
Our study, should provide evidence for or against the slot/resource model per each 
memory type (IM/FM/VWM) and should verify if a ‘blindsight’ like phenomenon 
may influence the performance or not. 
• In our experiment we use a change-detection partial-report task with eight 
oriented bars, by the use of a yellow cue that appears during the retention interval 
(to test IM or FM) or during the test display (to test VWM). Participants have to 
compare the test array with the sample array indicating whether there was a 
change or not. 
Moreover, we induce resource allocation by the use of a blue precue that appears 
before the memory display and predicts with 75% probability where a change is 
going to happen (75% valid, 25% invalid precue). Participants are instructed to use 
the precue, and to ensure that, punishment is very high if they get a valid precue 
trial wrong, while in case of invalid precue the punishment is medium-low. 
Other trials, instead, are designed to encourage participants to spread their 
attentional resources among all items. On this purpose no precue is presented and 
medium reward/ medium punishment is given. 
In order to evaluate which of the two models fits better each memory type, we will 
compare the precision of the representations when they received low attention 
(invalid precue condition) with the resolution of the memories when they received 
more attention (no precue condition). 
If the slot model is correct, then we expect that our manipulations will not affect 
precision. After all, according to the slot model, precision per item is fixed.  
Conversely, if the resource model is correct, precision for no precued objects 
(supposing normally expected)  should be higher than for the invalid precued items 
(and thus supposedly less expected). 
Furthermore, to find out whether performance may be based on some kind of 
‘blindsight’ like phenomenon, we will investigate if performance and metacognition 
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are strictly linked or not; indeed a correlation between them would indicate that 
the blindness does not occur, while no correlation would indicate the presence of it. 
Finally, if all memory types are based on the same general principle, then we should 
find evidence for resources or slots across the board; while if the different memory 
types are based on independent mechanisms, one memory type may be resource 






3. GENERAL METHODS 
The general set-up hereinafter described is identical for all the experiments, we 
presented human volunteers with a cued change detection task (Becker et al., 2000; 
Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 2003; Makovski & Jiang, 2007; Sligte et al., 
2008, 2009, 2010) that allows measuring the capacity of Iconic memory, fragile 
visual short-term memory (VSTM) and  visual working memory in a single 
experiment. 
 
3.1. Participants  
In total, 27 students (17 females, 10 males; age range 18-28 years, mean age = 22.5, 
SD=2.4) of the University of Amsterdam participated in a training sessions that 
preceded the main experiments (see Section 2.4). All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. For their participation, subjects received course credits 
or a financial compensation, plus extra reward accordingly with the score totalized 
(in two experiments). The local ethics committee of the University of Amsterdam 
had approved the study and participants gave their written informed consent 
before the start of the experiment.  
 
3.2  Equipment and stimuli  
Stimuli were generated in MATLAB (Math-Works) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997) and presented on a 19-in LG CRT display 
(type FB915BP) at a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The subjects were seated 75 cm away 
from the screen, resulting in a total display size of 27.2° × 20.5° in visual angle. 
All stimulus displays had a black background. Throughout the entire experiment, a 
red fixation dot (0.47° x 0.47°) was present in the center of the screen, and it only 
turned green for 500 ms to indicate the start of a new trial in no precue trials or for 
1200 ms during the presentation of the precue, in valid and invalid precue trials. 
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The memory and test displays consisted of eight white rectangles (2.08° × .52° in 
size) having horizontal, vertical, or oblique orientations. Individual rectangles were 
placed on an imaginary circle (radius 4.68°) around the fixation dot. 
Spatial cues consisted of a three-pixel-thick line, square shaped (2.29° x 2.29°) in 
one of the eight possible locations. The precue was blue, while the cue was yellow. 
 
3.3. Training  
The experimental sessions were preceded by a training session of 45 min in which 
participants performed the cued change detection task. Only who scored a mean 
percentage of correct trials of at least 75% was allowed to participate in the 
following experiments.  
The practice session consisted of 10 blocks of 42 trials (420 trials in total). At the 
end of each block subjects were allowed  to pause and they received feedback on 
their partial and total performance level. 
Participants were instructed to maintain fixation at a red dot in the middle of the 
screen throughout each trial. At the start of each trial, the red fixation dot turned 
green for 500 ms. After this, the memory array containing eight rectangles with an 
orientation of 0°, 45°, 135° or 180°, according to random design, appeared for 250 
ms (Fig. 10). Participants were instructed to remember the orientations of the 
rectangles in this memory array to the best of their ability.  
There were three types of trials (memory-condition) each one corresponding to one 
of the 3 memory conditions: 
1. For iconic memory evaluation, early retro-cue trials were used that is a 500 ms 
cue was presented 100 ms after offset of the memory array and this cue indicated 
which of the eight rectangles might change orientation between memory and test 
display. Another 1400 ms later, the probe array appeared and participants had to 
indicate by button press whether the cued rectangle had changed orientation 





2. For fragile VSTM evaluation, late retro-cue trials were used that is a 500 ms cue 
was presented 1000 ms after offset of the memory array and after 500 ms the test 
array appeared. 
3. For visual working memory evaluation, post-change cue trials were used that is a 
500 ms cue was not delivered during the retention interval, but simultaneously with 
the probe array, 1000 ms after offset of the memory array. On this trial the 500 ms 
cue was presented 1000 ms after offset of the memory array to keep this condition 
comparable to the retro-cue condition. 
The test display remained on the screen until participants gave a response by 
pressing one of two buttons of the mouse. The left button was always associated 
with change responses and the right button with no-change response.  After each 
wrong response, the word “wrong” appeared for 500 ms in the middle of the screen 
as feedback, while in case of correct performance there was no feedback and a new 
trial immediately started. 
In addition, participants were informed that the cue was always valid and none of 
the other rectangles could change orientation.  




The change always consisted of a 90° rotation and occurred on 50% of trials. 140 
trials per memory type were performed, randomly mixed within blocks. 
Participants that did not reach a mean score of 75% received course credits or a 
monetary reward for their participation, but were not allowed to participate in the 
final experiments. Out of 27 participants, 7 subjects (5 females) did not reach this 
75% criterion. The training served two purposes: first, to exclude unmotivated or 
unable participants, and second, to train participants in the use of the cues in 
general. 
 
3.4 Experimental session 
The 20 participants that passed the training task (12 females, 8 males) took part in 
the experiment (age 18-28). 
 
3.4.1 Design and procedure 
The main task was the same as in the training task (section 2.3), so the subjects had 
to indicate whether memory and test display were identical or not. In contrast with 
the training task, in order to modulate attention, three different attention-
conditions were added, namely valid-precue, invalid-precue and no-precue. 
In both precue trials a blue predictive cue appeared  for 200 ms, 500 ms before the 
presentation of the memory display. This precue indicates which location will 
probably be highlighted (75% valid trials) by the following yellow cue that indicates 
at which location the bar of display 1 and display 2 have to be compared to each 
other.  Thus, in case of valid trials the precue indicated the same location of the 
following yellow cue, while in case of invalid trials the precue highlighted a different 
spatial location than the following yellow cue.  
The no-precue trials were without the blue cue as in the training task. An overview 
of different trial types is shown in fig. 12 
The invalid trials shifted the attention far from the actual potential changed item, 
permitting us to evaluate the performance when the attention is lower than in the 
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no-precue trials where participants spread their attention equally among all items. 
To be sure that participants used the precue, at the end of each block they received 
feedback on their valid-precue performance level that should be at least 90% 
correct. If for three blocks the score was lower the experiment stopped. In addition 
they received partial and total performance level.  
Since the valid trials had been used just to assure that participants used well the 
precue, they were not included in the following analysis. 
Within each trial, the memory array was set up by eight rectangles with a random 
orientation between 0° and 360°. The test display was the same of the memory 
array in case of no-change trials, while during change trials the bar, indicated by the 
yellow cue, could rotate 30°, 60° or 90°. These 3 different angle-conditions were 
introduced to assess the resolution at which a change is detected, indeed we 
assumed that 30° of change requires  a more detailed representation of the stored 
item than a 60° or 90° of change. 
The test display remained on the screen until participants gave a response by 
pressing one of two buttons of the mouse. The left button was associated with 
change responses while the right button with no-change response. 
Before giving the feedback, a metacognition screen appeared. We asked them to 
bet from 1 to 4 on their answer accordingly with their awareness, thus clicking on 
“1” or “2” meant that they were not sure and they were probably guessing, while  
“3” or “4” that they were confident on the response. 
To incentive them to do their best and to ensure the honesty of the wager, the 
participants gained (reward) or lost (punishment) points depending on their 
accuracy multiplied for their bet, and at the end of the experiment the total points 
were converted in money. 
As feedback, the program automatically calculated and displayed the points scored, 
when subjects earned points the number was written in green, while if they lost 





The calculation of the points per trial is summarized below: 
 
• If VALID PRECUE trial (low reward – high punishment)  
- correct answer:+1 point x bet (1 2 3 or 4)  
- wrong answer: -5 points x bet  
 
• If INVALID PRECUE trial (medium reward – medium punishment)  
- correct answer: +1.5 points x bet  
- wrong answer: -1.5 points x bet  
 
• If NO PRECUE trial (medium reward – medium punishment)  
- correct answer: +2 points x bet  
- wrong answer: -2 points x bet  
 
Participants performed 38 blocks of 50 trials (1900 trials in total) split in two 
sessions of two hours each. At the end of each block participants were allowed to 
rest.  
Within 1900 trials 1/3 had been allocated to Iconic memory trials, 1/3 to Fragile 
VSTM and 1/3 to Visual Working memory. For each type of memory 3/5 were valid 
trials, 1/5 invalid and 1/5 no precue trials. Inside each type of attention-condition 
34% were no-change trials, 22% had 30° of change, 22% 60° of change and 22% 90° 

























































































































































































































































4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We computed memory capacity using a formula developed by Cowan (2001). The 
formula is K = (hit rate – chance + correct rejection – chance) × number of objects 
presented. This formula provides an estimate of the representational capacity and 
accounts for guessing by subtracting 50% change performance. 
Shapiro-Wilk test shown that data were normally distributed and statistical analyses 
were performed with correlation analysis and repeated measures ANOVAs. When 
sphericity was significantly violated, we report the values from the correction 
applied. The data were analyzed using SPSS. 
 
4.1 Preliminary Analysis 
The first block of each session was a practice block, and therefore was not included 
in the following analysis. 
4.1.1 Tiredness 
In order to check whether the performance decreased over time due to tiredness, we 
did a correlation and regression analysis between all blocks and the average accuracy 
(percentage of correct responses) of all participants in all conditions tested. 
The analysis revealed that there was no linear correlation between blocks and 
accuracy, rp =.313, p=.205, indeed, the 
curve that best describes the 
distribution of points is the logarithmic 
one (R2=.237, p=.040) (fig.13) 
There was a small fluctuation of the 
average accuracy from 87.10% to 
90.65%, no evidence of tiredness, but 
rather change detection performance 
tended to slightly improve over the 
course of the experiment.  




For each subject, we calculate the capacity K of the items stored in each type of 
memory by means of  the formula developed by Cowan (2001):  
K = (hit rate – chance + correct rejection rate – chance) × number of objects 
presented. 
Over the entire set of “change” trials, the proportion of hits (a “change” response in 
a “change” trial), is known as the hit rate and similarly, over the entire set of “no 
change” trials, the proportion of correct rejections (a “no change” response in a “no 
change” trial)  is known as the correct rejection rate. Chance is 50% and number of 
objects is 8 items.  
 
4.1.3 Distance 
Within invalid trials we carried out a further division depending on the distance at 
which the yellow cue appeared compared to the location indicated previously by 
the blue precue.  
As an example, considering when the precue directs  the attention on the item 1, if 
the following cue indicates one of the two adjacent items, 2 or 8, the distance of the 
actual location from the presumed location is assumed as “Close”. Instead, the 
distance is assumed as “medium” if the cue indicates the items 3 or 7, while is 
considered “Far” if the cue indicates one of the farthest items 4,5 or 6 (fig. 14). 
To estimate possible differences in the capacity according to the distance, data 
were analysed by means of Repeated measures ANOVA according to a 3x3 within 
subject design, with Distance (Close, Medium, Far) and Angle (30°,60°,90°) as within 





For all memory types ANOVA showed significant Distance (WM: F(2,38)=15.10, 
p=.000; FM: F(2,38)=23.76, p=.000; IM: F(2,38)=29.63, p=.000;) and Angle (WM: 
F(2,38)=9.76, p=.000; FM: F(2,38)=19.39, p=.000; IM: F(2,38)=26.61, p=.000; ε=.696 




interaction (WM: F(4,76)=.45 p=.772; FM: F(4,76)=1.51, p=.230 ε=.661 Greenhouse-
Geisser correction; IM: F(4,76)=1.04, p=.390;)  
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction revealed that the average capacity at 
close distance (WM: 2.90 ± 0.34 SE; FM: 5.31 ± 0.30 SE; IM: 5.74 ± 0.33) was  
significantly higher than the average capacity at medium (WM: 0.92 ± 0.39 SE, 
p=.002; FM: 2.55 ± 0.47 SE, p=.000; IM: 3.00 ± 0.41, p=.000) and at far distance 
(WM: 0.74 ± 0.28 SE, p=.000; FM: 2.67 ± 0.38 SE, p=.000; IM: 3.23 ± 0.33, p=.000). 
Conversely, there was no difference between medium and far distance (WM, FM, 
IM: p=1.000). 
On the basis of these results, we excluded close distance trials from the following 
analysis, taking into account only medium and far distance trials (henceforth 
termed “invalid” trials), where there was the lowest amount of attention available. 
 
4.1.4 Gender effect 
In order to assess a possible divergence between males and females in the capacity 
to store items in different attention and angle conditions, data were analysed by 
means of Repeated measures ANOVA according to a 2x3 within subject design, with 
Attention (Invalid, No-precue) and Angle (30°,60°,90°) as within subject factors, and 
gender as between factor. The same analysis was replicated for the three memory 
types. 
Since ANOVA revealed no sex differences (WM: F(1,18)=.011, p=.917; FM: 
F(1,18)=.100, p=0.756; IM: F(1,18)=.300, p=.591) the following analysis was 







4.2.1 Visual Working Memory 
In order to evaluate possible differences in Capacity related to the different kind of 
Attention and Angles, data were analysed by means of Repeated measures ANOVA 
according to a 2x3 within subject design, with Attention (Invalid, no-precue) and 
Angle (30°,60°,90°) as within subject factors. Post-hoc Bonferroni comparison was 
performed when appropriate. Significance was set at p<0.05. 
ANOVA yielded significant Attention (F(1,19)=69.57, p=.000), and Angle 
(F(2,38)=35.374, p=.000, ε=.814 Huynh-Feldt correction) main effects as well as a 
significant Attention X Angle interaction (F(2,38)=8.42, p=.001).  
Indeed, as shown in Figure 16, the average capacity of the no-precue condition 
(3.649 ± 0.25 SE) was greater than the average capacity of the Invalid condition 
(0.77 ± 0.24 SE).  
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction (Table 2) revealed that the average 
capacity for 30° of change of orientation (1.41 ± 0.18 SE) was significantly smaller 
than the average capacity for both 60° and 90° (60°: 2.34 ± 0.23 SE, p=.001; 90°: 
2.88 ± 0.18 SE, p=.000). Also, the capacity for 60° of change was significantly smaller 

















Average Capacity percentages measured for each Angle of change within No-precue 
and Invalid conditions are shown in Figure 18.  
Post hoc analysis performed separately within No-precue and Invalid conditions 
revealed that in the No-precue condition (Table 3) the average capacity for 30° of 
change (2.45 ± 0.27 SE) was significantly smaller (p=.000) than the capacity for both 
60° (4.06 ± 0.31 SE), and 90° of change (4.44 ± 0.26 SE) (p=.000). No differences (p= 
.126) between 60° and 90° were found.  
On the contrary, for the Invalid condition (Table 4) there was a significant 
difference (p= .005) between the mean capacity of 30° (0.38 ± 0.26 SE) and 90° of 
change (1.32 ± 0.28 SE), but no difference (p=1.000) between 30° and 60° (0.63 ± 
0.31 SE). Also the comparison between the average capacity of 60° and 90° revealed 











pairwise comparisons Angle 
 
(I) angle (J) angle Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
30 60 -0.929* 0.221 0.001 
30 90 -1.469* 0.151 0.000 
60 90 -0.540* 0.149 0.005 
 Table 2 






(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b 
30 60 -1.61* 0.28 0.000 
30 90 -2.00* 0.20 0,000 










(I-J) Std. Error Sig.
b 
30 60 -0.25 0.32 1.000 
30 90 -0.94* 0.26 0.005 









Average Capacity percentages measured for each Attention-condition within each 
Angle of change are shown in Fig 19.  
Post hoc tests (Table 5) revealed that there was significant differences between the 
two Attention types for both 30° (p=0.000), 60° (p=.000) and 90° of change 
(p=.000), with capacity in the No-precue condition higher than in the Invalid one 
(30°: 2.45 ± 0.27 SE vs 0.38 ± 0.26 SE; 60°: 4.06 ± 0.31 SE vs 0.63 ± 0.31 SE; 90°: 4.44 

























no-precue invalid 2.07* 0.38 0.000 
 
    Pairwise Comparisons 60 
 
no-precue invalid 3.43* 0.41 0,000 
 
    Pairwise Comparisons 90 
 





4.2.2 Fragile Visual Short Term Memory 
ANOVA yielded significant Attention (F(1,19)=115.44, p=.000), and Angle 
(F(2,38)=36.56, p=.000) main effects, but no significant Attention X Angle 
interaction (F(2,38)=2.03, p=.145) (Fig. 22, 23) 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 20, the average capacity of the No-precue condition 
(5.73 ± 0.20 SE) was greater than the average capacity of the Invalid condition (2.65 
± 0.33 SE). 
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction (Table 6) revealed that the average 
capacity for 30° of change of orientation (3.49 ± 0.26 SE) was significantly smaller 
than the average capacity for both 60° and 90° (60°: 4.43 ± 0.25 SE, p=.000; 90°: 
4.47 ± 0.24 SE, p=.000) (Figure 21). Instead, the capacity for 60° of change was not 







pairwise comparisons Angle 
 
(I) angle (J) angle Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
30 60 -0.95* 0.17 0.000 
30 90 -1.16* 0.12 0.000 
60 90 -0.22 0.14 0.400 
 Table 6 












4.2.3 Iconic Memory 
ANOVA yielded significant Attention (F(1,19)=109.10, p=.000), and Angle 
(F(2,38)=52.8, p=.000, ε=0.585 Greenhouse-Geisser correction) main effects, but no 
significant Attention X Angle interaction (F(2,38)=0.727, p=.490) (Fig.26, 27) 
Indeed, as shown in Figure 24, the average capacity of the No-precue condition 
(6.10 ± 0.20 SE) was greater than the average capacity of the Invalid condition (3.14 
± 0.29 SE).  
Post hoc tests using the Bonferroni correction (Table 7) revealed that the average 
capacity for 30° of change of orientation (3.73 ± 0.26 SE) was significantly smaller 
than the average capacity for both 60° and 90° (60°: 4.97 ± 0.20 SE, p=.000; 90°: 
5.16 ± 0.20 SE, p=.000) (Figure 25). Also, the capacity for 60° of change was 







pairwise comparisons Angle 
 
(I) angle (J) angle Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig.b 
30 60 -1.25 * 0.18 0,000 
30 90 -1.43* 0.18 0,000 
60 90 -0.18* 0.06 0,020 
 Table 7 











For each participant, Metacognition was measured as the average of bet points 
(from 1 to 4) with respect to the total number of trials within each Attention and 
Angle conditions. 
To evaluate if the average Capacity and the average value of Metacognition (tab. 8) 
are strictly linked, for the three memory types we performed a correlation and 
regression analysis that revealed a significant positive correlation (WM: RP=0.978, 
p= .001; FM: RP=0.953, p=.003; IM: RP=0.896, p=.016). 
 
The straight 
regression lines that 
best fits the points, 
for each memory 
type, are 



































invalid 30 ,375 2,7073 2,135 3,3740 2,217 3,3654 
invalid 60 ,625 2,8012 2,750 3,5070 3,455 3,6016 
invalid 90 1,317 2,8990 3,067 3,5915 3,760 3,6664 
no-precue 30 2,448 3,1985 4,839 3,6206 5,238 3,5719 
no-precue 60 4,055 3,2999 6,115 3,7910 6,493 3,8902 






The present study is focused to unveil whether the precision with which each 
representation is stored in Iconic Memory (IM), Fragile Visual Short Term Memory 
(FM) and Visual Working Memory (VWM), may be flexibly allocated according to the 
shift of attention, or whether it remain fixed irrespective of attention. In other 
words our goal is to understand the underlying mechanism of these different visual 
memories, if they follow the resource (Bays & Husain, 2008; 2009; Palmer, 1990; 
Wilken & Ma, 2004) or slots models (e.g. Luck & Vogel, 1997; Anderson et al., 2011; 
Zhang & Luck, 2008). 
Furthermore, we measured metacognition to determine whether performance was 
influenced by some kind of blindsight like phenomenon. For the three memory 
types, the statistical analysis revealed a correlation between capacity and 
metacognition, therefore there is no blindsight effect.  
To investigate which of the above mentioned models provides the best description, 
we employed the change detection task that permits to estimate separately 
capacity and precision of the memory representation stored, by manipulating the 
amount of change that have to be detected (Barton et al. 2009; Umemoto et al., 
2010). Indeed, recent findings (Awh et al., 2007; Scolari et al., 2008) argue that the 
main limiting factor for change detection performance depends on similarity 
between the crucial item in the sample display and the new item that replaced it in 
the test array.   
When the changes are large, comparison errors are minimized, and the 
performance depends essentially on whether or not the critical item has been 
stored in VWM (Pashler, 1988; Cowan, 2001). Therefore, the rate at which big 
changes are identified provides an estimate of the number of elements held in 
memory (capacity). 
On the contrary, when the changes are relatively small, the performance may be 
limited by the precision of representations held in memory. There is a greater 
probability that comparison errors occur, that is observers fail to perceive the 
difference between the sample and test items even when the critical item is 
encoded in memory. Given that higher resolution is required to detect smaller 
 39 
 
changes, the incidence of such comparison errors may provide a useful definition of 
mnemonic resolution (Awh et al, 2007; Barton et al., 2009; Umemoto et al., 2010). 
In our experiment we kept a constant number of 8 items, but we modify the 
similarity between the sample and test display of the item to be remembered. 
When the change occurs, the cued rectangle may rotate 30°, 60° or 90°, assuming 
that the smaller the variation is, the more detailed precision of the stored item is 
required to detect the change, and vice versa; in other words a higher precision 
representation require more resources than a lower precision one. 
Moreover, through the no precue and invalid trials, we induced a modulation of 
attention to assess if such a manipulation may induce a modification in the 
precision of the element encoded in memory. 
 
• According to flexible resource models (e.g., Alvarez and Cavanagh, 2004; Bays and 
Husain, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004), capacity in VWM is determined by competition 
for a central pool of resources that can be flexibly and asymmetrically distributed 
among the elements to be stored, such that items of higher importance or 
complexity receive a larger proportion of the overall resources. A fundamental 
assumption of these models is that the proportion of resources devoted to each 
item determines the corresponding resolution of each representation in VWM. 
From this viewpoint, during no precue condition, attention and resources are 
equally spread among all items so that each one should be encoded with the same 
resolution. Instead, in the invalid condition, a greater proportion of resources would 
be allocated to the precued item producing a decrease of precision of the cued 
item. 
• By contrast, discrete slot-based models (e.g., Barton et al., 2009; Rouder et al., 
2008; Zhang and Luck, 2008) propose that resources in VWM are allocated in a 
quantized manner and that capacity is defined by a limited number of discrete slots 
(about 3 or 4) each one can be assigned to a single item; in this way observers can 
choose which items store in VWM, but they cannot asymmetrically distribute 
resources among items, because each slot is characterized by a fixed amount of 
resources, that leads to a fixed precision per element. 
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According to these models, in the no precue condition when attention is uniformly 
distributed across the entire display, only about 4 items, with a determined 
resolution, should be encoded. Instead, during the invalid condition, more slots 
could be devoted to the precued item, leaving less slots available for the cued item. 
In this case, we expect a decrease only in the number, and not in the precision, of 
the stored object, given that slots are characterized by an intrinsic and 
unchangeable amount of resources. 
 
Our results showed that the shift of attention had a significant influence in all the 
three memory types, indeed the overall capacity, irrespective of degree of change, 
is lower in the invalid condition than in the no precue condition. 
Also the different resolution at which the change occurred yielded to different 
performances, in fact, regardless of the attention, the overall capacity for 30° of 
change was lower than the capacity for 60° in the three memory types, as well as 
the capacity was lower for 60° of change in comparison with 90° for both VWM and 
IM, although significance in IM was not as strong as in the VWM. In FM the capacity 
for 60° of change was the same as 90°. 
The central finding is the evidence that VWM has a different operating principle 
with respect to IM and FM; indeed statistical analysis revealed a strong interaction 
between Attention and Angle for VWM, while there is no such interaction for both 
IM and FM. In the specific, it seems that VWM may follow a resource based model, 
while IM and FM a fixed-slot model. 
• For what concerns VWM, analyzing in detail the performance profile across 
different degrees of change, it is apparent that the capacity had a different trend of 
decrease according to the attention paid to the display. 
The accuracy in the 90° of change condition gives an estimate of capacity (Cowan, 
2001). If, at a certain degree of change (e.g. small changes), capacity drops, this 
• To summarize, the key issue is that, during the invalid trials, flexible resource 
models predict a decrease in precision of the cued item, while the slot models 
predict that the resolution of the stored items remains the same as in the no 
precue condition, although there is a decrease in the capacity. 
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implies that the resolution of encoded elements is less accurate then this amount of 
change. In other words, it means that the representation of the stored items is not 
enough detailed (have not enough resolution) to detect that amount of change. 
In the no precue condition, the capacity is the same for both 90° and 60° and a drop 
occurs at 30° of change, implying that the precision of the stored items is below 60°. 
In the invalid condition, besides an overall decrease in the capacity, there is already 
a drop at the 60° condition and no further drop at the 30°, implying a precision 
between 60° and 90° of change.  
Therefore it means that participants, in the no precue condition, have a 
representation of the cued item with enough resolution to well discriminate 90° and 
60° of change, but not 30°. The same observers, in the invalid condition, have a 
worse representation of the cued item, reflecting a lower resolution that permits to 
discriminate 90° of change, but no longer 60° and even less 30°; in other words, 
precision for not expected representations lies between 60° and 90°, while for 
more expected representations is below 60°. 
The evidence that precision of each representation varies as a function of attention 
is in disagreement with the claim that the slots have a fixed precision, therefore our 
findings are in contrast with previous ones of Zhang and Luck (2008) and other 
authors (e.g., Barton et al., 2009; Rouder et al., 2008). 
Moreover, attention can be likened to a spotlight (Norman, 1968)  that enhances 
the efficiency of detection of events within its beam (Posner, 1980). 
Attention, operating as a spotlight, distributes resources over the selected areas of 
the visual field (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Eriksen & Webb, 1989), so that most resources 
are allocated at the center of attention, but there is a certain spread around it in the 
near spatial vicinity, and decreases as the distance increases. 
Our findings support that attention influences both capacity (Kane et al., 2001) 




• Instead, for what concerns FM and IM, we find an apparently different picture. 
Although there is an overall decrease in the capacity in the invalid condition 
compared to the no precue one, the performance profile in the two conditions 
follows the same trend; indeed, in both attention-condition the capacity remains 
stable for 90° and 60° and a drop occurs at 30° of change, indicating a precision 
below 60°. Thus, in contrast with previous findings (Vandenbroucke, 2011) it seems 
that attention affected the capacity, but has no effect on the precision of each 
representation stored. 
In summary, our findings suggest that FM and IM may be based on slots with fixed 
precision, and the resources cannot be distributed asymmetrically unlike VWM. 
 
Since visual interference erases FM (Pinto et al., 2013), it could happen that in 
active recall task, where no visual interference is presented, the performance 
measured doesn’t come from an expression of WM but from FM because is not 
deleted.  Therefore we argue that  the discrepancy between our results and those 
of Zhang and Luck are induced by the different type of task used: they used an 
active recall task that could have led to an estimate of FM, characterized by fixed 
precision slots, while we used a recognition task where the reappearance of the 
rectangles with the cue masks both IM (Coltheart, 1983; Sperling, 1960) and FM 
(Pinto et al., 2013), leaving available only WM that resists interference by new 
stimuli (Sligte et al., 2008). 
Moreover, since an active recall is harder to perform than a passive recognition 
task, it may induce a high precision, low capacity strategy, leaving less room for 
flexible resource effects to occur. 
We improved the experimental design of Zhang and Luck in other two crucial 
points: 
First, we used oriented rectangles instead of a color wheel. Colors could lead to 
questionable and not clearly interpretable answers, indeed, for example is yellow 
really more different from blue than from red? With the orientation we solve this 




Second, since both Zhang and Luck and Murray et al. found that participants were 
not able to use the strategic information provided to trade-off quality with quantity 
in VWM, we decided to use a stronger manipulation consisting in the use of a 
precue paradigm that forced people either to allocate attention on a specific 
location or to spread it evenly among all the items. Thus, we argue that their 
strategy was not strong enough to unveil a possible flexible allocation of the 
resources. 
 
In the light of these findings, it seems that in VWM the resolution for each 
representation is not fixed, but can be modulated by attention. However, the 
nature of capacity limits in this on-line store remains an open question, indeed, also 
our experiment revealed an  upper bound on memory storage of about 4 objects, as 
reported in other studies (e.g., Alvarez & Cavanagh, 2004; Awh et al., 2007; Luck & 
Vogel, 1997; Zhang & Luck, 2008). 
Two alternative models have been proposed to characterize the nature of capacity 
limits in VWM: 
1. Flexible-resource model suggests that VWM capacity is determined by a limited 
pool of resources that can be shared among an unlimited number of items, 
although the fidelity of each stored representation declines as the number of stored 
items increases (Wilken & Ma, 2004; Bays & Husain,2008; Bays et al. 2009).  
- On one hand, Bays et al. (2009) have proposed that beyond 3 items the probability 
of making “swap errors” increases, that is, the participants may misremember 
which item was at the probed location and report the wrong item from the display. 
- On the other hand Wilken & Ma (2004) argue that VWM performance is limited by 
an increase in neuronal noise in stimulus representation,  which is a function of set 
size. 
2. The slots + resources model, proposed by Zhang and Luck (2008), asserts that 
there are a limited resource that can be flexibly allocated among a fixed number of 
slots, so that each slot could have a different precision. Therefore each item is 




These two components, number and resolutions, seem to be independent factors, 
implemented in distinct cortical regions and associated with distinct aspects of 
individual memory ability. 
This hypothesis is supported by Xu and Chun (2006) who demonstrated that 
whereas activations in the inferior intraparietal sulcus (IPS) tracked a fixed number 
of objects regardless of object complexity, the activity in the superior IPS and 
lateral occipital complex (LOC) was sensitive to the complexity of the stored objects 
(fig. 29). Moreover, the maximum VWM capacity was about four objects for simple 
shape features and only two objects for complex shape features, that is coherent 
with our results in the no precue condition, assuming that the increase of 
complexity corresponds to the decrease of the degrees of change to be detected.  
 
Although to our knowledge there are no studies that investigate whether capacity 
and resolution of IM and FM are encoded by different areas of the brain, the neural 
distinction found in the maintenance of online visual memories, and our findings 
that capacity, but not resolution, is affected by attention, raise the question 
whether these two factors, even in IM and FM, are implemented in distinct cortical 
regions. 
  
Figure 29|  From Xu & Chun (2006). Superior IPS (green), LOC (red) and inferior IPS (orange) 
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